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TOWARD A SCIENCE OF IMPARTIAL
JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR
Harry Kalven, Jr.*
One of the strongest aspects of these studies by Professors Cook
and Goldman is that they represent continuities in research. They
thus give promise that social research in law may be ready to
emulate its neighbor, the natural sciences, in the patient, incremental adding to knowledge by taking its point of departure from
prior studies. In this instance both studies, as their notes amply
document, are placed in a general area-the empirical study by
quantitative techniques of judicial decision-making-in which
considerable work has already been mounted. But the continuities
are more specific and more emphatic.
Professor Goldman is extending techniques for analyzing collegial judicial behavior to groups of judges who do not, like the
United States Supreme Court, act en banc, but rather in panels of
three. Since there is considerable business in common between
the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals, he appears to have
enlarged significantly the arena in which judicial behavior can be
systematically scrutinized to detect voting blocs and attitudinal
syndromes.' Professor Cook, as her repeated use of the prior
Markham study shows, is building directly not merely on studies
of sentencing-something of a vogue at the moment-but on
studies on her precise topic, sentencing in draft cases.
In another positive aspect, these studies show once again that
the inability to conduct controlled experiments need not put an
end to the law's aspirations toward empirical inquiry. 2 And they
.underscore how enormously useful the sensible collection of statistics by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts
may prove to be; it is providing a stockpile of data for endless

0 Harry A. Bigelow Professor of Law, University of Chicago. A.B., Chicago, 1935;
J.D., 1938.
1 For an amateur struggle with counting votes and detecting blocs at the Supreme
Court level, see Kalven, Foreword:Even When a Nation Is at War, 85 HA.v. L. Rxv.
3, 6-10 (1971).
2 See Kalven, The Quest for the Middle Range: Empirical Inquiry and Legal
Policy in LAW IN A CHANGING AMERCA 56, 69-71 (G. Hazard ed. 1968); Zeisel, Reflections on Experimental Techniques in the Law, 2 J. LEGAL STUDIES 107 (1973).
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secondary analyses by imaginative social scientists.3 What is most
promising is that both studies have been able by statistical techniques to exploit routine descriptive judicial statistics as a kind
of circumstantial evidence of the factors underlying judicial behavior.
I found the Cook study, perhaps because its topic is more
readily accessible, particularly intriguing as to the possibilities in
creative cross-tabulation. She does not limit herself to cross-tabu
lating the severity of draft sentencing against the familiar demographic variables, but introduces three variables that carry a
promise of theory: judicial environment, judicial reference groups,
and judicial structure. She is thus able to probe subtle relationships one would have thought only in depth interviewing could
detect. Several points invite special coment.
One cannot but admire the ambitious effort to trace American
Legion pressure on draft sentencing. The technique was to use
census figures on the percentage of veterans in each state who belonged to the Legion. Professor Cook thus derived a Legion concentration index to run against her judicial severity index to test
whether severity corresponded to Legion density, and hence, by
hypothesis, to Legion pressure. One can easily think of reasons, as
I am sure Professor Cook did, why these measures might be too
crude to detect such pressures if they did exist. But such common
sense methodological criticism misses the point. What is arresting
and welcome is that a study utilizing only judicial statistics could
nevertheless pursue so lively a quarry.
On at least three occasions it seems to me Professor Cook turns
up modest correlations which trigger reflection on the well springs
of sentiment. Consider the point that severity correlated inversely
with judicial workload: the more draft cases a judge handled,
the more lenient his sentencing of draft violators. Repeated exposure to the dilemma of the young draft violator apparently made
the judge more, understanding and more sympathetic. A classic
8 It is an important point in designing social research whether it can proceed by
re-analyzing existing records, that is, by secondary analysis, or whether in addition
to the burden of analysis, it must also carry the burden of generating its own data.
In the Jury Studies, the study of court congestion, H. ZEISEL, H. KALvEN & B. BucHHOLZ, DELAY IN THE COURT (1959), was an instance of secondary analysis; the study
of judge-jury differences in deciding the same case, H. KALVEN & H. ZEsEL, THE
AMERIGAN JURY (1966), and the study of mock juries, R. SIMON, THE JURY AND THE
DEFENSE OF INSANITY (1967), were instances where it was necessary first to create the
data.
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defense of the reliance on the jury in criminal cases has been
founded on the need to avoid a tendency toward stereotyping of
criminals by weary, disheartened, experienced judges; the jury
was always new and freed thereby to take a fresh look. The distinctive puzzles generated by draft violations during the Vietnam
War produced in the judge the fresh reaction.
Or consider the suggestions that judges with sons of draft age
tended to be more severe, while judges with military service backgrounds of their own tended to be more lenient. The correlations
are not powerful, but the results, while at first surprising, are on
reflection plausible and rewarding. They honor the complexity of
the policy issue posed for the judge in dealing with a draft violator during the Vietnam War. A tiny step perhaps, but a step on
the long road toward more general theories of judicial decisionmaking.
These are, then, good examples of a genre of behavioral research, and we are glad to have them added. One. nevertheless
cannot suppress some ambivalence about the genre itself.4 I suspect that ambivalence arises not because we are persuaded such
efforts can tell us nothing useful about judicial behavior, but
rather because we are so anxious to have them tell us more than
they do. Perhaps I misunderstand, but they seem to be content
with documenting the fact that judges are human and imperfect,
and that all sorts of factors impinge on their decision-making.
They thus risk the appearance of telling us, after empirical study,
that there is no Santa Claus. Or to vary the unkind joke, they
bring to mind a comment some 20 years ago by the atomic scientist, Leo Szillard, about American policies re atomic secrets.
There is, said Szillard, no secret and we intend to keep it. Apropos
to the students of judicial behavior might be that there is no secret
and they intend to tell it.
. I am left puzzled about what they conceive to be the counter expectation which is impeached by their study. In The American
Jury, Hans Zeisel and I were able to array the decisions of juries
4There is 'ambivalence too about the special burdens of exposition in such
studies. It is a formidable task to write English while seriously utilizing statistical
data. The need to set forth the apparatus of inquiry tends to make reports topheavy and too little like essays. Further, the need to measure neatly often requires
the introduction of intermediate concepts which are themselves artifacts and at
least one remove from experience. Thus the severity index in the Cook study conceals whether the sentence included prison.
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against the decisions of judges and thus provide a baseline against
which to appraise the jury's performance. How much and when
did the jury depart from the judge? What is the analogous baseline
for these two studies? In Professor Cook's study, for example, some
61 percent of all cases and 71 percent of all judges had sentences
for draft violations which fell within the 10-29 brackets on a scale
that ran from 1 to 99. This could be read as a notable degree of
consensus and regularity among judges in a highly unstructured
situation. In Professor Goldman's study the courts of appeal were
unanimous over a six-year period in some 94 percent of their cases,
and this despite the evidence of voting blocs.
The slogan "a government of laws not men" has always been
understood to mean, in operation, a process of decision-making
by men. The fundamental premise in the idea of impartial judges
and rules of law is that certain kinds of decision-making, for example, by judges, can by institutional arrangements and role discipline be made to show less variance and less correlation to personal
factors than other kinds of decision-making, for example voting
and consumer preferences. 5 Beyond this there is the question of
whether different arrangements will produce different degrees of
impersonality in decision-making. In Professor Cook's instance,
would, for example, exposure to sentencing seminars or official
guidelines for draft cases alter the distribution of results on her
severity index?
Watergate, among its many effects, has perhaps lent new significance to the question of impartiality in decision and made clear
that it is not simply a myth sponsored by lawyers. The vivid example concerns not so much the judges involved, but the role of
the independent prosecutor. What is it we expect of him? Certainly in this instance everyone has in mind some achievement of
impartiality and even-handedness, some independence not only
from obvious political pressures but from personal bias as well.
Assume that in some way recurrent decisions were presented to,
say, a dozen different independent prosecutors, and We later made
a study of their responses. If they each had fulfilled our current
aspirations for an independent prosecutor, what would the statistical pattern of results be like? Since prosecutorial decisions
will necessarily involve some close judgmental points, can we ex5 See Blum & Kalven, The Art of Opinion Research: A Lawyer's Appraisal of an
Emerging Science, 24 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1956).
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pect them to agree all the time? If they disagree, what would be
the statistical evidence that they had remained independent?
The burden of making sense out of the idea of the independent
prosecutor or the impartial judge does not rest alone on the empirical student of judicial behavior from political science. It rests
equally on the student of jurisprudence from the legal profession.
We found that empirical study of the jury increased sensitivity to
theorizing about the jury as an institution. Empirical study of
judicial behavior must stimulate and sharpen theory about the
aspiration to have a human being who as a judge is tolerably
impartial and tolerably independent. What seems to be needed
is to have the student of jurisprudence join the student of judicial
behavior in first translating the normative expectations into statistical expectations, and then in devising ways to "gradually, very
gradually"6 test their implementation.
Writing a few years ago on the relationships between law and
social science, I concluded my essay with a slogan. It will be clear
now that I am slow to have a new idea. The slogan was: "let us
'empiricize' jurisprudence and intellectualize fact finding."7
6 Hutchins, The Autobiography of an Ex-Law Student, 1 U. Cm. L. REv. 511, 518

(1934).
7 Kalven, supra note 2, at 72.
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